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CITIZENS UNITED &  
CORPORATE & HUMAN CRIME 
Christopher Slobogin† 
N CITIZENS UNITED V. ELECTION COMMISSION,1 the Supreme Court 
held that corporations have the same First Amendment rights 
as human beings. As one commentator put it, for First 
Amendment purposes “corporations are now ‘people.’”2 Thus, 
like human citizens, corporations can exercise their right to free 
speech by spending as much money as they like trying to influence 
elections.  
I’m not going to attack or defend Citizens United. Rather, I ex-
plore below, briefly and somewhat fancifully, Citizens United’s im-
plications for criminal liability, corporate and otherwise. Citizens 
United could influence the fate of corporations suspected of wrong-
doing in four ways, three of them doctrinal and one practical. First, 
it reinforces the long-accepted but still highly controversial proposi-
tion that, despite their inanimate nature, corporations can be crimi-
nally prosecuted for harm they cause. At the same time, Citizens 
United provides fodder for those who would soften current corpo-
rate liability and punishment rules. Third, the decision could bolster 
the case for expanding corporate criminal procedure rights. Finally, 
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1 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
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whatever the merit of these doctrinal predictions, as a practical 
matter Citizens United will help ensure that corporations are rarely 
punished to the limits of the law.  
Citizens United might also have a significant impact on how the 
criminal justice system treats street criminals, at least if the doc-
trinal developments just alluded to come to pass. After all, the 
courts can hardly withhold from human offenders and suspects the 
dispositional breaks and procedural rights they have granted non-
human corporations. Right?  
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
he litigation that led to Citizens United is the latest sally in a cen-
tury-long debate over whether corporations should be consid-
ered purely artificial entities or instead treated as natural persons 
guaranteed the same constitutional rights that individuals enjoy. 
Over that period, corporations have managed to acquire due proc-
ess rights, equal protection rights, and a number of other entitle-
ments.3 Outside of a few lost skirmishes over the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments (discussed further below), the natural rights folks 
have pretty much triumphed. Citizens United is just another notch in 
their battle axes.  
But Citizens United does have a downside for corporations. Al-
though corporations have for some time been subject to criminal 
liability on the ground that they are legal persons, the argument has 
persisted that only the officers and employees responsible for the 
crime, not the corporate entity itself, should be prosecuted. Some 
have contended, for instance, that just as the legal personhood of 
young children does not require that they be held criminally ac-
countable, the fact that corporations are persons for most constitu-
tional purposes is irrelevant to whether they can be charged with 
crime.4 But that argument makes less sense after Citizens United. 
                                                                                                
3 Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 
41 Hastings L.J. 577, 579 (1990). 
4 John Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting Demands of 
Law and Ethics, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 507, 509-10 (2008). 
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Corporations, the Supreme Court said in that case, must be allowed 
to participate in the “marketplace of ideas.”5 Whatever might be the 
case for infants, an entity that has political will also has free will.  
Once it is established that a corporation can be an autonomous 
actor, it follows that the criminal penalty for corporate wrongdoing 
should be proportionately harsher as the mens rea – perhaps aggre-
gated over multiple actors within the corporation – progresses from 
negligence through reckless toleration to premeditation. And while 
a corporation cannot be put in prison, if a corporation is a person it 
can be required to do penance in ways other than paying a fine. In-
deed, restorative justice processes and shaming penalties might be 
even more meaningful in this setting, because they are likely to re-
ceive national attention when large companies are involved. Corpo-
rations could be required to suffer sanctions victims impose, and 
public castigation of malfeasant businesses could occur on TV and 
radio. Just think what judges could do to BP in this type of regime 
(for starters, require that its green flower logo drip with oil). 
So Citizens United could be the final blow against those who resist 
criminal liability for corporations. But it could also have a mitigat-
ing effect when the government seeks to prosecute, in two ways. 
First, strict liability and liability for simple negligence, currently 
staples of corporate criminal doctrine,6 are usually anathema when a 
person is being punished, at least when the punishment involves 
something other than a small fine.7 Second, as the Supreme Court 
suggested in its recent case striking down life-without-parole for 
juveniles, all criminals, except those who commit murder or are 
too old, are entitled to show they can be rehabilitated.8 In the cor-
porate context deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments are already popular, because they reduce corporate recidi-
                                                                                                
5 130 U.S. at 906. 
6 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 
(1909). 
7 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 739-70 (5th ed. 2010) . 
8 Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (requiring that juveniles be 
given “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated . . . 
rehabilitation”). 
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vism and minimize damage to the wealth and jobs the corporation 
represents.9 Now corporate bodies can make even stronger pleas for 
such “treatment.” 
So much for doctrine. The practical consequences of Citizens 
United for corporate criminal liability are less subtle. Given the ad-
ditional political power corporations and chambers of commerce 
now have,10 the probability increases substantially that the relatively 
lenient criminal liability and dispositional rules just described will 
find favor. Without contemplating any type of corruption, it can be 
assumed that, after Citizens United, public officials who do not like 
strict liability crimes and harsh sentences in the corporate context 
are more likely to be elected.  
FAIRNESS OBJECTIONS 
 common objection to corporate criminal liability, even a soft 
version of it, is that it unfairly penalizes shareholders and em-
ployees who had nothing to do with the criminal action. One could 
argue that this objection has particular purchase when the case for 
corporate criminal liability is based on Citizens United. After all, 
corporate speech is presumably designed to further the goals of all 
of those who have an interest in the corporation and thus likely to 
be supported by owners and workers alike. In contrast, corporate 
crime is almost always committed by only a few actors; virtually 
everyone else connected with the company can be assumed to con-
demn their malevolent deeds. So, it can be argued, a case about 
whether collectives have free speech rights has nothing to say about 
whether collectives can commit criminal actions.  
Let us assume that the shareholders and most employees of a 
wrongdoing corporation are not complicit in any way with the  
                                                                                                
9 See Peter Henning, Corporate Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1417 (2009). 
10 See Jim Hightower, Corporate America Speaking Out, TruthOut, Aug. 18, 
2010, available at www.truth-out.org/jim-hightower-corporate-america-
speaking-out (noting that, during the 2010 election campaign, the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce planned to spend more than double what it spent in 2008, a presi-
dential election year, with most of the money going to Republicans).  
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harmful corporate action and assume further that any criminal pen-
alties imposed on the company would impose a loss on them dis-
proportionate to any gain from the wrongdoing. This type of “un-
fair” collateral damage is unfortunate. But it infects all of criminal 
justice. When human offenders are sent away to prison, their fami-
lies, complicit or not, are often left without a breadwinner and lose 
whatever emotional and other intangible sustenance their loved 
ones provide. In some cities, the criminal justice system deprives 
whole communities of a large percentage of their young males, in 
ways that can seriously damage the social structure.11 A rehabilita-
tive approach would significantly mitigate these types of harms in 
both the corporate and individual contexts, but if the system insists 
on retributive punishment, harm to innocents is inevitable.  
                                                                                                
11 Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 323, 
345-47 (2004) (discussing collateral consequences of conviction on offenders, 
their communities, and their families). 
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At the same time, the collateral damage produced by criminal 
prosecution, independent of the stigma already caused by the fact 
that grave harm has occurred, has often been exaggerated in the 
corporate context. Those who oppose criminal liability for corpora-
tions often trot out the case of Arthur Andersen as an illustrative 
horror story. But even had there been no criminal charges Arthur 
Andersen would have suffered immensely. What is left of the com-
pany today is targeted with hundreds of civil lawsuits.12 And the 
firm that gave a passing grade to the financial shenanigans of Enron 
– probably the most hated company in the United States – as well as 
the books of WorldCom – which suffered the biggest bankruptcy in 
history – would have been the bad boy of the accounting world re-
gardless of whether it, or anyone in it, had ever been criminally 
prosecuted. 
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
hile Citizens United reinforces the case in favor of corporate 
criminal liability, it also provides a basis for enhancing the 
procedural rights of corporations suspected of crime. The Court’s 
First Amendment rationale could well foster more robust Fourth 
Amendment protections for corporations. And the decision might 
even support the case for a corporate privilege against self-
incrimination, a right that, to date, courts have been unwilling to 
grant.  
To see how the analysis might work, consider in more detail the 
Court’s reasoning in Citizens United. The majority stated, “Speech is 
an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold 
officials accountable to the people. The right of citizens to inquire, 
to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a 
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means 
to protect it.”13 Since corporations are citizens too, the Court went 
on to hold, they too have a fundamental right to hold officials ac-
countable and to speak and use information.  
                                                                                                
12 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 917, 
950-51 (2003). 
13 130 S.Ct. at 898.  
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 The privacy, property and autonomy interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment are also “essential” to democracy. As Monrad 
Paulsen stated years ago, “All the other freedoms, freedom of 
speech, of assembly, of religion, of political action, presuppose that 
arbitrary and capricious police action has been restrained.”14 Fur-
ther, as Neil Richards has demonstrated, the Fourth and First 
Amendments are intimately connected. In his article Intellectual Pri-
vacy, Richards explains why government efforts to obtain certain 
types of information or invade certain types of spaces infringe not 
only the expectations of privacy normally associated with the 
Fourth Amendment but also affect entitlements under the First 
Amendment. He makes a strong case for the proposition that this 
protection extends to any activities associated with freedom of 
thought and freedom to explore ideas – including communications, 
websites visited, books owned, and every term entered into a 
search engine.15 
If corporations are entitled to freedom of speech, and protection 
from unregulated government intrusion is necessary to ensure that 
speech is freely exercised, the Fourth Amendment’s application to 
corporations may need to be revisited. Right now, corporations 
have virtually no Fourth Amendment rights where it really counts.16 
The Court has held that a subpoena for corporate records is valid 
even if the government only seeks to satisfy “official curiosity,” so 
long as “the inquiry is within the authority of the agency” and “the 
demand is not too indefinite.”17 Yet subpoenas can be used to obtain 
all sorts of information relevant to corporate speech, ranging from 
phone and computer logs to email messages and accounting re-
cords. One might object that corporations cannot have “intellectual 
                                                                                                
14 Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in 
Police Power and Individual Freedom 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962).  
15 Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Texas Law Review 387 (2008). 
16 In some inspection situations, a warrant requirement exists, but individualized 
suspicion is not required for these warrants and exceptions to the requirement 
abound. See Charles Whitebread and Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure: 
An Analysis of Cases and Concepts 319-324 (5th ed.2008). 
17 United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 532, 652 (1950). 
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privacy.” But Citizens United’s willingness to grant corporations the 
right “to inquire, to hear, to speak and to use information” puts a 
real crimp in that argument. 
The same goes for the privilege against self-incrimination, which 
up to now has not applied to corporations because of the Supreme 
Court’s 1906 decision in Hale v. Henkel.18 Hale’s apparent rationale 
for its conclusion – besides the obvious one that according corpora-
tions a right to remain silent could derail the regulatory state – was 
that, even if a corporation had a Fifth Amendment right, it could 
not be asserted by third parties (e.g., the corporate officers) nor by 
the corporation itself, given its non-human status. But if corpora-
tions can possess and exercise a right to speak (per Citizens United), 
they can possess and assert a right not to speak. It is true that, in 
First Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court suggested that the Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination privilege is a “purely personal” right 
and therefore is not meant to provide protection against coercion of 
a corporate entity.19 But that statement ignored Hale’s reluctance to 
decide definitively whether a corporation is a person for Fifth 
Amendment purposes. It also is hard to reconcile with the fact that, 
since Hale, the Court has extended to corporations the guarantees 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Due Process Clause, both of 
which are also rights that the Fifth Amendment accords to “any per-
son.”20 
These contentions about the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights 
of corporations, if accepted, would require adjustments to fairly 
well-entrenched precedent. But the extra political power corpora-
tions now have because of Citizens United could help the courts see 
the light of day. If so, there could be other repercussions as well.21 
                                                                                                
18 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
19 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1979). 
20 201 U.S. at 70. See Mayer, supra note 3, at 618-19. 
21 One particularly startling possibility: corporations could have a “race.” Long ago 
some courts took this idea quite seriously. See, e.g., People’s Pleasure Park Co., Inc. 
v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439, 63 S.E. 981 (1909). Although these decisions found that 
even all-black corporations are impersonal, colorless entities, they relied on as-
sumptions rendered suspect by Citizens United, which might require extension of 
Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime 
AUTUMN 2010 85 
BENEFITS FOR HUMANS? 
ince this piece is already full of conjectures, it won’t hurt to add 
a few more. Consider first a story from another domain. Federal 
Rule of Evidence 410 prohibits the trial use of statements made 
during the plea bargaining process unless the defendant somehow 
forfeits or waives the rule’s protection. This rule benefits white 
collar and street criminals alike. But it exists solely because of the 
corporate bar. The history of Rule 410’s genesis makes clear that, 
without the political clout of the latter group, the rule’s proponents 
would never had prevailed over a very hostile Department of Jus-
tice.22 
It would be nice to think that the same dynamic could occur if 
corporations began flexing their post-Citizens United muscle in the 
criminal justice system. If so, perhaps pro-defendant changes in 
strict liability doctrine brought on by litigation in the corporate 
context would lead to elimination of the Pinkerton and felony mur-
der rules that permit conviction of humans for accidental and non-
negligent crime.23 If corporations are able to convince the courts 
that recovery rather than ostracism is the best way of reducing re-
cidivism, perhaps sentences for human criminals would become 
more focused on rehabilitation than retribution. Maybe government 
efforts to access personal information about human suspects from 
banks, phone companies and other third party institutions (an inves-
tigatory practice that is currently unrestricted by the Constitution24) 
would require more justification if corporate records are accorded 
greater protection under the Fourth Amendment. And perhaps rec-
ognition of a corporate Fifth Amendment would not only rejuve-
                                                                                                
anti-discrimination laws to raced or gendered corporations. 
22 See Christopher Slobogin, The Story of Rule 410 and United States v. Mez-
zanatto: Using Plea Statements at Trial, in Evidence Stories 103, 105-08 (2006). 
23 For a description of the strict liability regimes established by Pinkerton v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1948) and the felony murder rule, see LaFave, supra note 
7, at 722-723 & 790-796. 
24 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 735 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735 (1979).  
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nate legal resistance to the rat-out-your-employees deals that have, 
in recent times, routinely been forced on corporate officers,25 but 
also percolate down to the back rooms of stationhouses and reduce 
the coercive pre-plea bargaining that goes on between police and 
human street criminals.  




                                                                                                
25 See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853 
(2007). 
